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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES G. CLAWSON and
1
JOAN M. CLAWSON, his wife;
T E X R. OLSEN and
MONNA L E E OLSEN, his wife; and
KEN CHAMBERLAIN and
j
J E A N N I N E W. CHAMBERLAIN,
'
Plaintiffs and Respondents, I Case No.
[

13653

vs.

BRUCE L. MOESSER and
I
R U T H ANNE MOESSER,
husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants. \

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF T H E KIND OF CASE
This is an action to quiet title to certain real property located in Sanpete County, State of Utah. Both Appellants and Respondents have claimed legal title in the
property.
1
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DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
The case was heard by the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, District Judge for the District Court of Sanpete
County, State of Utah. The matter came on before the
court on the 16th day of January, 1974, at Manti, County of Sanpete, State of Utah, on Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Plaintiffs (R. 9) and by the Defendants (R. 74), each representing that there are no
disputed issues of fact, and each of which motions was
supported by affidavits, documentary exhibits, and supporting briefs. The court granted plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment. The court also held that the redemption by C. H . Spaulding was valid and terminated
the rights of Walker Bank under their trust deed and
foreclosure proceedings. The Plaintiff was further ordered to reimburse Defendant for the amounts Defendant had paid on 1973 property taxes on the subject property (R, 97).

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment entered by the lower court against them and seek
judgment in their favor as a matter of law, and an order
of the court quieting title to the property in the Defendants-Appellants, hereinafter referred to as Appellants,
and against the Plaintiffs-Respondents, hereinafter referred to as Respondents.
2
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S T A T E M E N T OF I A
The property in question is locates »'u Sanpete
County, and is described as follows;
"The N . E . Y4 and the E . y2 of the S.E. 14 of
Section 31, Township 15 So. Range 15 E. 5 Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, Containing 240 Acres,"
The property is sometimes described as the following lots
under the recorded plat of Spring City Rancheros:
"Lots 1 through 6; 8 through 12; I I through 17;
19 through 22; 24; 25; 29 through 32; and 37
through 44, all numbers inclusive."
Stanley Title Co. held fee simple title in the subject property, and on October 1, 1965 conveyed title to
C. H . Spaulding and Mid-Continent Construction Co.
(R. 14)
.,.. . . :. .
Mid-Continent Construction Co. conveyed a warranty deed for Lot No. 2 to the Nielsons on September
6 196(5 (R. 45).

Two days later, Mid-Continent Construction Co.
entered into a trust deed agreement with Walker Bank
and Trust Co., on September 8, 1966, with Mid-Continent Construction Co. as the trustor and Walker Bank
and Trust Co. as the trustee, and beneficiary (R. 46).
April 10, 1969, the Clawsons had executed on a
judgment against C. H . Spaulding, and a Sheriff's sale
was had on the property at which time the Clawsons purchased the subject property (R. 50).
3
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On July 25, 1969, a "Lis Pendens" was filed by
Walker Bank and Trust Co. against C. H . Spaulding,
Mid-Continent Construction Co., and the Clawsons, to
prevent any further action being taken until Walker
Bank & Trust Co.'s foreclosure proceedings against C.
I I . Spaulding, Mid-Continent Construction Co. and the
Clawsons had been concluded (R. 52).
On the basis of the Clawsons' purchase at the previous Sheriff's sale, on October 16, 1969 a sheriff's deed
was conveyed to the Clawsons for the subject property,
(R. 54), which conveyance took place after Walker
Bank's foreclosure had begun.
On October 25, 1969, the Clawsons entered into a
stipulation with Walker Bank and Trust Co. whereby
the Clawsons stipulated that Walker Bank and Trust
Co.'s trust deed had priority over any claim the Clawsons might have to the subject property (R. 56).
On November 6, 1969, a judgment was filed in the
foreclosure proceedings in favor of Walker Bank and
Trust Co., and against C. H . Spaulding, Mid-Continent
Construction Co., and the Clawsons (R. 15).
Pursuant to the judgment and the foreclosure proceedings by Walker Bank and Trust Co., on December
30, 1969 a Sheriff's sale was conducted on the subject
property, and the property was sold to Keith McArthur
(R. 20).
On January 22, 1970, a deficiency judgment was
entered in favor of Walker Bank & Trust Co. and
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against C. IT. Spaulding, Mid-Continent Construction
Co., and the Clawsons, the deficiency judgment being
based on the previous foreclosure proceedings (R. 21).
C. H . Spaulding redeemed from the Sheriff's sale
to Keith McArthur on June 30, 1970 (R. 23).
On July 28, 1971 the Clawsons, Oisens, and Chamberlains conveyed to James Clawson, Tex Olsen and
Ken Chamberlain by quit claim deed (R. 66).
On February 12,1973, Walker Bank and Trust Co.
executed on their deficiency judgment based on the
trust deed foreclosure proceedings against C. H . Spaulding, Mid-Continent Construction Co. and the Clawsons,
and the Moessers purchased the subject property at the
sheriff's sale on March 21, 1973. Six months later on
September 24,1973, a Sheriff's deed was conveyed to the
Moessers, granting them title in fee simple to the subject property (R. 25, 27, 32).

ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
THAT T H E FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
I N S T I T U T E D BY W A L K E R BANK AND
T R U S T CO. D I S C H A R G E D A L L R I G H T S
A N D ENCUMBRANCES OF T H E RESPONDENTS IN T H E SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Both by stipulation and by law, at the time of the
Walker Bank foreclosure suit against Spaulding, Mid5
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Continent Construction Co., and the Clawsons; Walker
Bank had an interest in the subject property superior to
that of the Respondents. On October 25, 1969, Olsen
and Chamberlain, as counsel for Respondents, filed a
stipulation in the District Court of Sanpete County,
Utah, in the case bearing Civil No. 5857, stating as follows:
"Come now the defendants, James G. Clawson
and Joan M. Clawson, and by and through their
attorney, Tex R. Olsen, do hereby stipulate that
the plaintiffs' trust deed has priority over any
right, title or interest of said defendants in said
property and the interest of the defendant was
acquired subsequent to the filing of said instrument by the plaintiff. Stipulated to this 25th day
of October, A.D., 1969." (R. 56).
This stipulation signed and filed by Respondents effectively placed them in a position subordinate to that of
Walker Bank and Trust Co. relating to the subject
property. When Walker Bank foreclosed on its mortgage, by law all rights of the Respondents were effectively discharged concerning the subject property. This
is the law as cited at 59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 523:
"It is generally held that a complete and valid
foreclosure discharges all rights, claims, mortgages, or other encumbrances acquired subsequent to the date of the mortgage foreclosed . . .
and it has been held that the lien of the junior
encumbrancer is not destroyed, but . . . is transferred from the land to the surplus foreclosure
fund."
The same fate meets liens other than those created by
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mortgages, as is explained at 59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 800:
"As a general rule, the lien of a junior encumbrance, cut off by the foreclosure of a mortgage,
is transferred in equity to the surplus foreclosure
fund . . . the foregoing rules have been held to
apply not only to the case of a junior mortgagee
but also to a junior creditor by judgment, execution, or attachment. . . . "
I t is the law in the State of Utah that a junior encumbrancer who is joined and properly served in an
action by a senior mortgagee to foreclose his mortgage,
loses all claims against the subject property. In Cowan
v. Stoker, 100 Ut. 377, 115 P.2d 153 (1941), the Utah
Supreme Court decided that the appellant, a junior
mortgagee, could not receive certain surplus monies derived from a foreclosure proceeding which had been instituted by the senior mortgagee. I n its decision, the
court stated:
"A junior mortgagee who is joined and properly
served in an action by a senior mortgagee to foreclose his mortgage, whether or not he appears or
pleads, is bound by the decree of foreclosure and
mag not thereafter assert a claim against said
mortgaged property•." [citations omitted] Id. at
154 (Emphasis added).
The court held that the lien of the junior encumbrancer
was effectively discharged by the foreclosure on the
senior encumbrance, and then continued to explain the
proper procedure that a junior encumbrancer should
follow:

7
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"Upon foreclosure of the senior mortgage the
lien of the junior mortgagee attaches to the surplus of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. [Citations omitted]" Id. at 154.
The court then directed its attention to the question of
whether the appellant had adopted the proper procedure
for asserting its claim for the surplus funds—not for the
subject property—in the courts.
I n the recent Oregon decision of Call v. Jeremiah,
246 Ore. 568, 425 P.2d 502 (1967), the Oregon court
quoted with approval the ahove-cited language of the
Utah Supreme Court, and reaffirmed that decision. Referring back to the Oregon court's decision in Ulrieh v.
Lincoln Realty, 180 Ore. 380, 175 P.2d 149 (1946),
also cited in Respondents' Brief the court said:
"Plaintiffs misconceived the purpose of foreclosure proceedings and the effect of the foreclosure decree. The effect of the foreclosure decree is not simply to extinguish the interest of the
mortgagee bringing the suit—it is designed to
extinguish all interests which are subordinate to
the foreclosing mortgagee's interest" Id. at 504
(Emphasis added and by the court).
I n the present situation, then, it must be held that the
foreclosure of the senior mortgage—which mortgage
was superior under the terms of the 1969 stipulation—
effectively extinguished all rights of the Clawsons or
their successors in the property. The court went on to
describe the position of one who purchases at the sheriff's
sale or redeems, such as Spaulding, in relation to a
junior encumbrancer, such as the Clawsons and Olsens.
8
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". .r/the judgment or decree therein destroys his
(the junior encumbrancer's) lien, and upon the
expiration of the time for redemption, the purchaser is entitled to the property free from the
lien. The subsequent mortgagor or lienor is remitted to the fund realized in the foreclosure proceedings. . . ." Id. at 504.
The same rule was followed, and the Utah Stoker decision, supra, was cited as authority, in the recent case of
In Re Castillian Apartments, Inc., 281 N.C. 709, 190
S.E. 2d 161, 162 (1972).
As previously stated, the rule which extinguishes a
junior encumbrance upon the foreclosure proceedings
on a senior encumbrance applies also to executions, attachments and other types of junior encumbrances apart
from mortgages. Therefore, at the time that Walker
Bank foreclosed its mortgage, Respondents' rights to
the subject property were effectively discharged and
Respondents had to look for any satisfaction on their
debt to the surplus foreclosure fund. Any interest that
the Clawsons may have had in the subject property as a
junior encumbrancer to Walker Bank was effectively
extinguished by Walker Bank's foreclosure action, to
which Respondents were joined (R. 15).
Also, in cases where the mortgagor redeems and
the junior encumbrancer fails to redeem, as occurred
here (R. 23), there is a large body of case law to the
effect that:
"The lien of a junior mortgage is lost by the failure of a junior mortgagee, a party to the proceed9
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ing, to redeem from the foreclosure of the senior
mortgage, and . . . such lien does not again become a lien on the property, on the mortgage
debtor's redemption from the senior mortgage."
59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 875 (c).
The claim of the Clawsons would, therefore, be lost as
of the date of Spaulding's redemption from the foreclosure sale.
POINT II.
T H A T T H E R E D E M P T I O N B Y C. H .
SPAULDING WAS VALID AND VESTED
T I T L E TO T H E SUBJECT P R O P E R T Y I N
HIM, AS W A S H E L D BY T H E DISTRICT
COURT.
Appellants do not question the finding of the court,
as expressed in the court's Order of February 4, 1974,
that the redemption by C. H . Spaulding was a valid redemption (R. 97). Under the law, Spaulding was entitled to redeem from the Sheriff's sale, 59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 819 (b), states, concerning redemption
statutes,
". . . the construction in any case of doubt or ambiguity should be in favor of the right to redeem
and to the end that the property of the debtor may
pay as many of his debts as possible.. . ."
Respondents claim at page 5 of the lower court Memorandum ( R 82) that no re-sale for a deficiency judg10
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ment can take place if the property was redeemed by
the Clawsons. Eut the property in this case was not
redeemed by the Clawsons; it was redeemed by Spaulding, the mortgagor (R 23, 97). The Clawsons made no
attempt to redeem, and subsequently forfeited any
alleged rights they may have had in the property. Therefore, the property may be resold for the balance of the
mortgage debt owing to Walker Bank.
Spaulding's redemption was a valid redemption,
and vested title to the property in him. The redemption
by Spaulding should be held valid as against the Respondents for the following reasons:
1. The redemption met the statutory requirements
as set out in Rule 69 (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
2. Spaulding was the mortgagor of the property
redeemed;
3. Spaulding was a named defendant in the foreclosure action brought by Walker Bank (R 15);
4. The stipulation between Walker Bank and the
Clawsons gave any priority to the interest held by
Walker Bank in the property, including any interest
in a deficiency judgment;
5. The Clawsons failed to make any attempt towards redeeming the property, thereby waiving ail
rights to the property;
6. Even if Spaulding had not been entitled to re11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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deem, the acceptance of his payment by the foreclosure
sale purchaser barred any claims by Respondents:
"Also, the liens of all those junior encumbrancers
or judgment creditors who were parties to the
suit and who might have redemmed but failed to
do so have been held to be barred . . . it would
seem, in case of redemption by one not authorized
to redeem, when his payment is accepted as a redemption by the foreclosure sale purchaser." 59
C.J.S., Mortgages Section 875 (c) ; and
7. Spaulding was personally liable on the mortgage
debt and therefore was an interested party able to
redeem. Iowa law, on which Section 78-37-6 of the
Utah Code Annotated is based, would seem applicable
here. In McLean v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha,
130 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. Iowa, 1942), the court described
the factual situation as follows:
"Here was such a [mortgage! debtor and had
become personally liable for a deficiency of
$2,000.00 in consequence of this mortgage foreclosure. H e had lost title through foreclosure of
the second mortgage. The time for redemption as
to the first mortgage had not expired when this
petition was filed." Id. at 128.
As will be observed, the factual situation is somewhat
similar to that of the present case. The court went on
to state:
"When the mortgaged land is sold by the debtor,
a right of redemption passes to the buyer, but the
debtor still has an equitable interest (arising from
his liability for a deficiency judgment) which entitles him to intervene in a foreclosure action, and

12
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a right of subrogation (as to redemption from a
first mortgage) where deed has passed under
foreclosure of a second mortgage. It thus appears
that the statute and decision law of Iowa recognizes an equity in the mortgage debtor in relation
to the property and redemption, which equity
exists even where he has parted with title, willingly, or through foreclosure of the junior mortgager Id. at 127-8 (Emphasis added).
However, as the District Court stated in its Order,
(R 97), the redemption by Spaulding was valid. The
District Court erred by failing to recognize that the
prior junior encumbrance of the Clawsons had been
extinguished by the foreclosure proceedings and by the
Clawsons' failure to redeem the property from the foreclosure sale.
P O I N T III. T H A T REGARDLESS OF ANY
INTERESTS OF RESPONDENTS IN T H E
SUBJECT PROPERTY A F T E R T H E FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS I N S T I T U T E D BY
W A L K E R BANK, W A L K E R BANK H A D
T H E R I G H T TO E X E C U T E ON S P A U L D ING'S R E D E E M E D P R O P E R T Y B Y R E A S O N
OF ITS DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT.
Regardless of the priorities between the parties
in the subject property, Walker Bank still had the right
to execute on Spaulding's redeemed property as a junior
lien holder at least. I t is generally recognized law that
a junior lien holder has the right to execute on his lien.
Therefore, if after the Walker Bank deficiency judg13
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ment was entered, Walker Bank assumed the position
of a junior lien holder, subordinate to the interests of
the Respondents in the property, then Walker Bank
still had the ability to foreclose as a junior lien holder.
59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 522 explains the relative
rights of the part is:
"As a general rule, the rights of a senior mortgagee or other encumbrancer are not affected by
the foreclosure of a junior mortgage; the sale
must be made subject to the lien of his mortgage
or encumbrance, and he retains the right to enforce it as before."
Therefore, even if Walker Bank should be held to be
a junior lien holder at the time the deficiency judgment
was entered, Walker Bank still retained the right as
a junior lien holder to foreclose on its junior lien.
P O I N T IV. T H A T T H E W A L K E R B A N K
D E F I C I E N C Y J U D G M E N T ON T H E SUBJ E C T P R O P E R T Y H A D P R I O R I T Y OVER
ANY I N T E R E S T O F T H E R E S P O N D E N T S .
Not only were the interests of Respondents in the
subject property extinguished by Walker Bank's foreclosure proceedings, and by Respondents' failure to
redeem; but the inerests of Walker Bank in the subject
property never ceased throughout the various proceedings. From the date that Walker Bank instituted its
foreclosure proceedings, it had retained a superior interest in the property, up to and including the time of
sale on the deficiency judgment.
14
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PlaintifFs-Respondents rely heavily on the Oregon
court's opinion in Ulrich v. Lincoln Realty Co., supra,
as authority for the theory that their judgment lien
must be superior to the deficiency judgment following
the foreclosure sale. However, the holding of the Oregon court specifically excludes the type of situation
found in the present case. That court explained that its
holding would probably not be applicable in a situation,
like the present one, where the judgment creditor—Respondents here—has been made a party to the foreclosure suit.
"One of the consequences of this doctrine is that
a party obtaining a judgment against the mortgagor while the foreclosure suit is pending would,
in case of redemption by the mortgagor or his
grantee, have a lien superior to that of a deficiency judgment rendered in the foreclosure suit.
At least this is true if such judgment creditor has
not been made a party to the foreclosure suit." Id.
at 150 (Emphasis added).
In view of the fact that Respondents have specifically
been made parties to the foreclosure suit (R 15), the
Ulrich decision, by its own specific language, is irrelevant to the present situation.
In addition, the Clawsons have previously stipulated in their action with Walker Bank that the interests
of Walker Bank in the subject property were superior
to those of the Clawsons (R 56). That stipulation is
evidence of the fact that the interests of Walker Bank
were intended by both Walker Bank and the Clawsons
to be superior to any interests claimed by the Clawsons.
15
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Such a relationship would apply not only to the original
foreclosure proceedings but also to the deficiency judgment. This court must hold that the superior interest
of Walker Bank was retained throughout the deficiency
judgment proceedings not only by virtue of the stipulationlation entered into by the parties, but also by
virtue of law. Although Respondents would have the
court believe that no jurisdiction recognizes a redemption as reviving the original mortgage lien to the extent
of the deficiency, such is simply not the case. Osborne
on Mortgages, Section 309 (2nd Ed. 1970), states that
the authorities hold that after redemptoin by the mortgagor, "even the lien of the mortgage under which the
property was sold revives as to the unpaid deficiency."
Id. at 642. Osborne goes on to state:
"Although the cases holding that redemption revives the original lien under which the property
was sold, except to the extent that the purchase
price on the sale discharged it, are those involving
< judgment liens, no distinctions between them and
mortgage liens can be upheld. New York is, perhaps, the leading jurisdiction for this doctrine,
[citations omitted!" Id. at 642, Note 63.
Several New York decisions support the position that
a redemption by the mortgagor revives the original
mortgage lien to the extent of the deficiency. I n Matter
of Hunter v. Seery, 206 App. Div 19 (1923), the court
held that where the land sold for a sum which did not
satisfy the judgment, the redemption by a subsequent
grantee of the owner from the purchaser at the execution sale restored the lien of the judgment, and that the
16
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land might be sold again to satisfy that judgment. In
Titus v. Lewis, 3 Barb. (N.Y.) 70, 72 (1848), the
court held that:
"By the very terms of this enactment, the redemption under the first sale rendered that sale
null and void, and, b}^ necessary consequence,
there having been no sale in law, there was no extinguishment of the judgment lien upon the
premises."
And, according to the note at 9 Cornell Law Quarterly
208 (1924), "all the succeeding cases in New York
have followed the construction of the statute laid down
by these two cases." The Walker Bank deficiency judgment on the property therefore had priority over any
interest of the Respondents in the property, for three
principal reasons:
First, Respondents Clawson had been specifically
named as parties in the original foreclosure action
(R 15), thereby precluding application of the rule of
the Ulrich case;
Second, Respondents Clawson had stipulated with
Walker Bank that the Clawsons' interest would be subordinate to that of Walker Bank (R 56); and
Third, there is a recognized body of law holding
that a redemption of property executed upon revives
the original mortgage lien to the extent of the deficiency.
The interest of the Clawsons, if it was not extinguished by the foreclosure proceedings themselves, was
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and must remain subordinate to the interests of Walker
Bank and, by line of title from Walker Bank, to the
interests of Appellants Moesser.

CONCLUSION
The foreclosure proceedings instituted by Walker
Bank in 1969 effectively discharged all encumbrances
of Respondents in the subject property. The interests
of Respondents in the subject property were in the
nature of a junior encumbrance, by virtue of the stipulation entered into by Respondents Clawson on October
25, 1969. Such junior encumbrances are held by law
to be discharged against the property by foreclosure
proceedings by a senior encumbrancer. That is what
happened in the present situation.
As a result, Respondents had no interests at all
in the subject property when C. H . Spaulding redeemed
the property from the foreclosure sale on June 30,1970.
The property vested in Spaulding, and Respondents
had to look for any satisfaction to the surplus monies
in the foreclosure fund, their rights to the subject
property itself having been extinguished by the foreclosure proceedings. Walker Bank then executed on
the property once again held by Spaulding, and the
property was sold by Sheriff's sale to Appellants Moesser, in whom the title now rests in fee simple.
18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Even if the court should hold that Respondents
retained some interest in the subject property after the
foreclosure proceedings, it must also be held that
Walker Bank did also, even if only as a junior encumbrancer. I t is the law in the State of Utah that a junior
encumbrancer may foreclose or execute on property in
which it has a valid interest. In other words, at the very
least Walker Bank had the right to execute on Spaulding's redeemed property by reason of the Walker Bank
deficiency judgment.
Last, it must be pointed out that Respondents'
argument that their judgment lien must be superior to
the deficiency judgment following the foreclosure sale,
is inapplicable to the present case. The Walker Bank
deficiency judgment retained its vitality in the present
case, and did not become subordinate to the interests
of Respondents for the reasons that: (1) the Clawsons
had been specifically named as parties in the original
foreclosure suit; (2) the Clawsons had stipulated with
Walker Bank that their interest was subordinate to
that of Walker Bank; and (3) the law recognizes that
a redemption of property executed upon revives the
original lien to the extent of the deficiency.
In view of the facts and the law applicable to the
present case, the court must find that the interest of
the Appellants Moesser in the subject property is
superior to that of the Respondents, if indeed the Respondents retained any interest at all in the subject
property after the original foreclosure proceedings were
19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

concluded. Therefore, jvidgment of the lower court
must be reversed, and judgment must be entered in
favor of the Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
JENSEN & LEWIS
Kay M. Lewis
320 South 300 East, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

., :

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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